📹 Security walkthrough coming soon
Purpose
Document security architecture for sovereign deployment pipeline, identifying trust boundaries, attack vectors, and mitigation controls. Demonstrates proactive security ownership and compliance awareness for RME engineering roles.
System Overview
The deployment pipeline consists of:
- Source Control: Git repository (GitHub)
- Build System: Makefile orchestration with cryptographic verification
- Deployment Target: Vercel CDN with static hosting
- Integrity Layer: SHA-256 hash chains with audit logging
Trust Boundaries
| Boundary |
Trusted Zone |
Untrusted Zone |
Control Mechanism |
| Source → Build |
Local development environment |
External dependencies |
Git commit signing, hash verification |
| Build → Deploy |
Verified artifacts |
Network transport |
TLS encryption, authenticated API calls |
| Deploy → Serve |
CDN infrastructure |
Public internet |
HTTPS enforcement, CDN security headers |
| User → Content |
Verified static content |
Browser environment |
CSP headers, no dynamic code execution |
Threat Categories
T-001: Supply Chain Compromise
Attack Vector: Malicious code injection via compromised dependencies or build tools.
Mitigation Controls
- SHA-256 hash verification at build time
- Minimal external dependencies (no npm/pip for core pipeline)
- Makefile-based build system (human-readable, auditable)
- Git commit provenance tracking
Risk Level: LOW (after mitigations)
T-002: Unauthorized Deployment
Attack Vector: Attacker gains access to deployment credentials or Git repository.
Mitigation Controls
- GitHub authentication with 2FA enforcement
- Vercel API tokens with scoped permissions
- Audit logging of all deployments (
SOVEREIGN_LOG.md)
- Deployment integrity verification post-push
Risk Level: MEDIUM (credential security dependent)
T-003: Content Tampering (CDN)
Attack Vector: CDN cache poisoning or man-in-the-middle attack during content delivery.
Mitigation Controls
- HTTPS enforcement (TLS 1.3)
- Post-deployment hash verification (
make audit)
- CDN security headers (CSP, HSTS)
- Subresource Integrity (SRI) for external resources
Risk Level: LOW (CDN provider handles core security)
T-004: Denial of Service
Attack Vector: Volumetric attack or CDN resource exhaustion.
Mitigation Controls
- Vercel CDN DDoS protection (provider-level)
- Static content (no compute-intensive operations)
- Rate limiting at CDN edge
- Monitoring and alerting for traffic anomalies
Risk Level: LOW (CDN infrastructure resilience)
T-005: Intellectual Property Theft
Attack Vector: Unauthorized copying or misattribution of prior art documentation.
Mitigation Controls
- Public timestamping via Git commit history
- Cryptographic proof of authorship (commit signatures)
- MIT License with attribution requirements
- Defensive publication establishing prior art
Risk Level: MEDIUM (legal protection, not technical)
Attack Surface Analysis
| Component |
Exposure |
Attack Surface |
Hardening |
| Git Repository |
Public |
Read access to all commits |
No sensitive data in commits, 2FA required for write |
| Build Pipeline |
Private |
Local machine compromise |
Hash verification, minimal dependencies |
| Deployment API |
Private |
API token exposure |
Scoped tokens, rotation policy, secure storage |
| Static Content |
Public |
XSS, clickjacking |
CSP headers, no user input, static HTML only |
Compliance Mapping
Security Frameworks
NIST Cybersecurity Framework
ISO 27001
OWASP Top 10
CIS Controls
Control Implementation
| Framework |
Control |
Implementation |
| NIST CSF |
PR.DS-6 (Integrity checking) |
SHA-256 hash verification, audit logging |
| ISO 27001 |
A.12.3.1 (Information backup) |
Git version control, commit history |
| OWASP |
A03:2021 (Injection) |
Static content only, no dynamic code execution |
| CIS Controls |
3.3 (Secure configuration) |
Vercel security headers, TLS enforcement |
Incident Response Plan
Detection
make audit automated integrity checks- Vercel deployment logs monitoring
- User-reported anomalies via GitHub issues
Containment
- Immediate deployment halt
- Rollback to last known good commit
- Revoke compromised credentials
Eradication
- Root cause analysis (5-Why framework)
- Remove malicious code/commits
- Patch vulnerabilities
Recovery
- Redeploy from verified clean state
- Verify integrity with
make audit
- Monitor for recurrence
Lessons Learned
- Document incident in
SOVEREIGN_LOG.md
- Update threat model and controls
- Implement preventive measures
Red Team Testing (Validation)
Test Scenarios
- Hash Bypass Attempt: Modify deployed file, verify
make audit detects mismatch
- Unauthorized Push: Attempt deployment without proper credentials (should fail)
- CDN Cache Poisoning: Verify hash verification catches tampered cached content
- Rollback Under Attack: Simulate compromise, execute emergency rollback procedure
Results
All security controls validated through adversarial testing. No bypasses discovered in current architecture.
RME Translation: Safety-First Mindset
Security engineering translates directly to RME safety protocols:
- Threat modeling = LOTO hazard analysis (identify failure modes before they occur)
- Defense in depth = Safety interlocks (multiple controls prevent single-point failures)
- Incident response = Emergency stop procedures (containment, root cause, prevention)
- Red team testing = Safety audits (validate controls under adversarial conditions)